As long as there is the UOC, which on the one hand complains on all international platforms about the “aggressive behavior” on the part the OCU and the “oppression of faith” on the part of government, but on the other hand wouldn’t mind reaching an understanding with Constantinople and somehow finding a way out of the impasse into which draft law 8371 drove it, the Ukrainian mission of the Ecumenical Patriarch can’t be considered completed.
Religious expert Tetiana Derkach reflected on the issue in her blog on the Religion in Ukraine website.
The vicissitudes around draft law 8371, which forces the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to sever relations with the Russian Orthodox Church under threat of a national ban, have reached a boiling point, behind which a public explosion is brewing. The tug of war between church jurisdictions, politicians and authorities – both central and local – has caused quite a stir across the world, and it seems that we are all standing on the threshold of some non-trivial developments. The Ecumenical Patriarchate can join the UOC-OCU-government triangle.
Authorities in-between “traitors” and “patriots”
Traditionally, in the post-Soviet space, churches try to have the government as partner. And since the main Orthodox jurisdictions compete for the favor of both believers and officials, the medieval (sic!) formula cujus regio, ejus religio is still relevant in Ukraine. Or rather, it’s the ecclesia. That is, the favor for a certain church depends on a government in power. Prior to the Orange Revolution, competitive balances were only being formed (the UOC won), then Viktor Yushchenko, who tolerated the Kyiv Patriarchate, tried to somehow protect it – until the first serious attempt to negotiate with the Ecumenical Patriarch on granting autocephaly. Then there was the triumph of the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych – and the UOC seemed to have grabbed the jackpot. But once Yanukovych lost power, his church lost a monopoly position as well. The stakes of the Kyiv Patriarchate went up, and President Petro Poroshenko succeeded in achieving the seemingly impossible – the recognition of the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine by the Ecumenical Patriarchate. But the timing was far from perfect as Poroshenko got into an election race that he eventually lost.
Volodymyr Zelensky was elected the country’s next President. From the very outset, he said he was far from religious affairs, triying to stay away from the confusing long-standing conflict between the UOC and the OCU. With great enthusiasm, the UOC began to exploit the president’s self-distancing from inter-church conflicts, counting on his incompetence in the matter. For a certain time, the UOC received legal immunity thanks to the then head of the State Service for Ethnic Policies and Freedom of Conscience, Olena Bohdan. But since the 2022 large-scale invasion, things have not gone according to plan. The term “spiritual independence” appeared in the president’s lexicon after the NSDC. Its authors implied the termination of the UOC as such. Sanctions were imposed on certain figures from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (including the head of office of the Kyiv Metropolis, Metropolitan Antony Pakanych), and a month after that draft law No. 8371 was tabled to the Verkhovna Rada, laying down a judicial mechanism to terminate the legal capacity of all communities belonging to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Late March 2023, members of the “metropolitan bureau” of the UOC came to the President’s Office to reach out to Zelensky but Office snubbed the delegation. From that moment, everything looked like the relationship between the UOC and the central authorities had passed the point of no return – despite the existence of UOC lobbyists in the senior power offices.
In October 2023, along with the adoption of draft law No. 8371 at first reading, the sponsor of the UOC in exile, Vadym Novinsky, hired a U.S. lobbyist Robert Amsterdam for his church. This adventurer with a lawyer’s license, by and large, had only one role to play – to provoke confrontation, manipulate, and put pressure on all influential actors in the U.S. to make sure Ukraine stopped receiving international aid, and and that politicians faced draconian sanctions. The UOC was in fact ready to defend itself at the cost of destroying the state of Ukraine as such. It is important to note that some members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church sincerely failed to understand why their church was under attack. After all, for many, especially younger people, the vigorous pro-Russian efforts of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was unknown until 2014.
Meanwhile, the OCU was going through other processes, which made any dialogue with the scandalous UOC pretty much impossible. For quite a while, the “one unifying Council – one Tomos” formula has remained mainstream. The point was that the Ecumenical Patriarch once suggested that all bishops in Ukraine gather and create an autocephalous local church, the OCU. The leadership of the UOC bluntly rejected the offer so it’s their fault, to put it simply. It is now only possible to become part of the OCU only through pinpoint efforts at a local level. Parishes are accepted “without re-baptism”, bishops have to pass a “lie detector”, after which, at best, only a third of them will be accepted. It’s clear that this is not a critical mass of UOC bishops, which means that their transition to the OCU is fiction. However, no other option is being considered by the OCU.
Tomos is on pause
The Tomos on autocephaly was too global and ambitious a project to be granted to only half of the Ukrainian Orthodox community. This means a very simple thing: the mission and task of mending the Ukrainian Orthodox division, as planned by the Mother Church, has not been fulfilled, and in the future, given the current developments, the situation may worsen even more. The main reason is the human factor, and it is difficult to say from whose side the resistance is now stronger.
Last but not least, the said principle of “one Tomos – one Council” becomes an obstacle to any negotiations. But it seems there are other opinions being considered in Constantinople. The Tomos, according to its philosophy, was not designed as a one-time document or action that was valid only for one day – December 15, 2018. More precisely, this would be the case if the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was represented at the Unification Council in the composition that would create canonical and legal consequences for this structure. But we have what we have.
Here is the lobal task and motivation behind granting the Tomos
“Our Peace with the Most Reverend Metropolitans and all-honorable, beloved in the Holy Spirit brothers and co-servants, out of the duty of care of the Great Church of Christ for the Orthodox world, to heal the schisms and divisions in the local Churches constituting a constant threaten, unanimously define and proclaim that the entire Orthodox Church, located within the borders of the politically formed and completely independent state of Ukraine together with the Holy Metropolies, Archbishoprics, Bishoprics, monasteries, parishes and all their church institutions under the patronage of the Founder of the One, Holy, Cathedral and Apostolic Church of the God-man, our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ, shall from now on exist as canonically autocephalous, independent, and self-governing.”
Therefore, the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which at that time restored its canonical jurisdiction over the Kyiv Metropolis, considered all Orthodox church structures to be one, but divided church under its omophorion. That is why the December 2018 Council was a Unification one. As is known, UOC bishops (except two of them) chose to ignore the event. And by doing so, they put themselves in an ambiguous canonical position. The Ecumenical Patriarch considers them titular bishops under the de facto control of the Russian Orthodox Church, who reside in Ukraine. In the calendar of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian episcopate is listed as heads of the dioceses of the Russian Orthodox Church, and in the calendar of the Ecumenical Patriarchate for 2024, the same figures are listed in the section “Orthodox Church of Russia” – no by titles, but by “registration”. In particular, Onufriy is metropolitan not of Kyiv, but in Kyiv, Ionathan is the metropolitan in Tulchyn and Bratslav, etc. This may indicate that Constantinople did not recognize the decision of the Council in Feofania in 2022, and neither did it recognize the full jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church over Ukrainian bishops.
This is what the Ecumenical Patriarch’s vision of the situation looks like, which he expressed in a letter of 2020:
“According to the canonical principle of territoriality, which is an integral and permanent fact of Orthodox ecclesiology, no Church can be present within the jurisdiction of the Church of Ukraine. Nevertheless, in the spirit of pastoral sensitivity, we temporarily tolerate the existence of Ukrainian hierarchs under Russia not as local ruling bishops, but only as titular or those who stat (have a residence) in Ukraine, hierarchs, according to canon 8 I of the Nicene Council, hoping that, by the will of God, they will soon unite with the local Church.
For this reason, His Eminence Onufriy is no longer considered as canonical Metropolitan of Kyiv, but as a hierarch residing in Kyiv, as was printed in the Yearbook of the Ecumenical Patriarchate for 2020. With these thoughts, we pray to the Holy Spirit, the Comforter, who always heals the weak with God’s grace and completes what is missing, brings all hierarchs, clergy and God-loving people in Ukraine closer to unity.”
But things never happened as expected. The division remained in place, and even intensified. One interesting statistic should be cited. In May 2019, a survey showed that 54.2% of Ukrainians had a positive or rather positive attitude to the Tomos, while 31.2% were neutral. At the same time, there were already doubts that the unifying mission of the Tomos was successful: 50.6% of Ukrainians called the effects of the Tomos rather unifying, while 30.5% called them rather disuniting. But at that time, the process of transitions of individual parishes to the OCU was gaining momentum, so that public assessment could be disregarded.
Unwanted guests
For five years, the churches never managed to establish at least some neutral communication. In 2019, the offended UOC severed relations with Constantinople and plunged into a fierce canonical and theological fight with the “Pope of Istanbul” and his “voluntarism” on foreign canonical territory. The war for survival at any cost unleashed by the UOC leadership eventually began to wear down the moderate clergy of the UOC itself, among whom there was a request to restore relations with Constantinople. By mid-April 2023, quite a large number of clergymen from the UOC turned to the Ecumenical Patriarch with a request to take their parishes under his care. The signatories explained their reluctance to join the OCU with to years of incurable mutual resentment, local parish conflicts, and the aggressive attitude towards them from the OCU, which indiscriminately considers them traitors and Moscow’s assets. As far as is known from sources from the Ecumenical Patriarchate, at that time, these requests heard no responses, although there were many signals about numerous local conflicts.
Confrontation involving force was not part of the basic settings of the Tomos so it caused concern for the Ecumenical Patriarch. At the end of April 2023, he offered to send his representatives to Kyiv to learn about the situation on the ground. The delegation consisted of ethnic Ukrainians – Metropolitan Hilarion (Rudnyk) of Winnipeg, Metropolitan Iov (Gechi) of Pisidia, and Protosyncle of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, Yakov (Krochak). The trip was scheduled for early July 2023, which was reported to the Ukrainian Consul General in Istanbul a few days before on behalf of the General Secretary of the Ecumenical Synod. The delegation faced a simple task: to reach out to as many stakeholders as possible (in both government and church), and to find out whether things had gone too far. And the main thing was to see whether there are points of contact for understanding and hope for the unity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. According to information from sources in the Ecumenical Patriarchate, Metropolitan Onufriy also received an offer to hold a meeting and even confirmed his readiness to do it. According to numerous reports, the delegation tried several times to come to Ukraine and meet with important stakeholders, but it never succeeded. One can only guess what stood on their way: technical inconsistencies, a subjective factor, or the unwillingness of the Ukrainian side for a serious conversation. The personal agreements between the Ecumenical Patriarch and Volodymyr Zelensky, who at that time was under the influence of the “patriotic” faction – in both church and politics – did not help either.
But at the same time, another envoy of the Ecumenical Patriarchate arrived in Ukraine – Metropolitan Emanuel of Chalcedon, who seems to be presenting his own vision of the priority functioning of the OCU with the solution of the UOC issue according to the ultimate principle. From the very beginning, Emanuel “supervised” OCU and still remains its patron. For some time, the Metropolitan of Chalcedon has been considered one of the main contenders for the patriarchal throne, and this has a certain impact on his relationship with his “beloved child” – the OCU, which he jealously protects. It seems that OCU is also satisfied with this fact. All doors were open for Emanuel, including due to the fact that he can freely travel across the border as a citizen of Turkey (in contrast to synodal delegates of Ukrainian origin holding Ukrainian citizenship).
Tomos vs Administrative Regulation
With the outset of Russian aggression in 2022, the UOC held the so-called Feofania Council, at which they faked a break with the Russian Orthodox Church, cleaning up their Charter a bit. After some time, OCU did the same, but with a different goal. To the existing basic Charter of the OCU (which corresponded to the spirit and letter of the Tomos and actually became an integral addition to it), developed by the Greeks and approved at the Unification Council on December 15, 2018, a “sub-statutory act” was added – the Statute (Regulations) on the OCU management, which entered into force in July 2023. That Regulation did not cancel the original Charter, but somewhat reformatted the “authority vertical”.
The text of the Regulation was not agreed with Constantinople on the grounds that it is apparently an internal document. But it contained innovations related to the rights and privileges of the Ecumenical Patriarch, in particular, an independent method of communication with other local churches (not through Constantinople), the right of the Ecumenical Patriarch to interpret the Charter (this right is transferred to the synod of the OCU), as well as the status of the Ecumenical Patriarch as an appellate instance (in the new Regulation, the highest judicial instance is the Local Council of the OCU). But the main innovation of the Regulation is a significant expansion of the rights and privileges of the head of the OCU himself, including vetoing the decisions of the Synod.
Undoubtedly, these steps did not go unnoticed by Constantinople, which in the conditions of a tough confrontation with Russia cannot allow a new wave of criticism and hate over the “wrong decision on Ukraine.”
What Constantinople can do
As long as there is the UOC, which on the one hand complains on all international platforms about the “aggressive behavior” of the OCU and the “persecution of faith” by the state, and on the other hand is not against finding an understanding with Constantinople and somehow finding a way out of the impasse into which the draft law drove it No. 8371, the Ukrainian mission of the Ecumenical Patriarch cannot be considered completed. A very heterogeneous, toxic and complex community, which is almost the same in size, remains beyond the OCU. The Ecumenical Patriarch cannot pretend that everything is fine – although there are enough people in the patriarch’s entourage who look at Ukrainian church vicissitudes with positivity and optimism.
But the question is, does he have the right to react in any way, if he himself gave the OCU complete freedom of action on its canonical territory? This question is answered by the Tomos itself and the original Charter.
Indeed, “the affairs of the Church in this country shall be managed, as the divine and holy Canons declare, freely and in the Holy Spirit, and without hindrance, without any other external influence.” But “in order to resolve important issues of an ecclesiastical, dogmatic and canonical nature, the Most Blessed Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine should, on behalf of the Holy Synod of his Church, turn to our Most Holy Patriarchal and Ecumenical See, seeking from it an authoritative opinion and firm mutual understanding.” The 2018 Statute details this requirement: “Issues not provided for in this Charter and requiring statutory regulation shall be considered by a mixed Commission appointed by the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Autocephalous Church in Ukraine.” And therefore, the Ecumenical Patriarch has the right to give parental advice in difficult situations and to use various means of resolving conflict issues for the sake of restoring the religious balance and motivating opponents to dialogue. This is not only his right, but also his duty. At the same time, it is he himself who determines whether the situation requires his assistance.
And what about the UOC, which today has a very narrow window of opportunity to jump out of the trap Moscow has driven it into? There is reason to assume that there is a conceptually maturing understanding that a complete break with the Russian Orthodox Church is an inevitable necessity that the government is ready to support. But no one will burn bridges with Moscow without guarantees of an alternative canonical “umbrella” – even a temporary one. Can Constantinople lend a helping hand? It sure can. Its door is open to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which, paradoxically, is also no stranger to it. Of course, there are more questions than answers here. How does this relate to the monopoly of the OCU on the canonical territory of Ukraine? According to what scheme is it possible to reformat the status of the UOC? How should one argue the legitimacy of such decisions before other local churches? And what has to be done if there is no unity in the UOC itself on this matter as it splits into uneven warring factions? And how should one neutralize the Russian Orthodox Church, which will certainly launch a large-scale counterattack? And how is this to be explained to the Ukrainian society, which sees in the UOC only traitors, collaborators, and agents of the FSB? These questions will have to be addressed according to the principle of “practice is the criterion of truth”. And history of church has accumulated a lot of instruments.
Contact has been established
Only a year on, one of the delegates of the synodal patriarchal commission, Metropolitan Hilarion of Winnipeg, finally made it to Ukraine and held a number of important meetings. The prayer breakfast under the patronage of the president, held on June 28, 2024, became the key platform for rather rich and, according to rumors, fruitful communication. The Metropolitan received a lot of positive reactions from his interlocutors. In addition, he met with People’s Deputy from the ruling Servant of the People faction, Oleksandr Kachura, who previously showed retained equal distance from all jurisdictions. According to the MP, “the main topic of the meeting was ways to achieve reconciliation and unity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy.” It can be assumed that during the 10-day visit, Metropolitan Hilarion had a busy schedule of meetings.
Although the authorities have decided not to spend their resources on achieving unity of the rival churches, they may be interested in the idea of a real separation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Russian Orthodox Church, which cannot be implemented only by the efforts of lawmakers and government officials. And this means it would be unwise to ignore the signs and signals sent by Constantinople, which was, is and will be the only Mother Church for Ukrainian churches.
