After the launch of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the question of canonical and legal status of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine and, in particular, the continued existence of this structure grew acute.
Religious expert Oleksandr Yefremenko addressed the issue on his Facebook page.
Throughout the 30 years of its existence, members of the Russian Orthodox Church have stated that they are completely independent of the Russian Church, and that they are united with the Moscow Patriarchate only through a “spiritual connection.”
They repeated this mantra during the Revolution of Dignity, the war in Donbas, and, not surprisingly, even today, the ROCinU leadership are trying to push it into the minds of Ukrainians. According to the church leadership, this spiritual unity is reflected in the fact that the name of the Moscow patriarch is commemorated during services in all their churches across Ukraine.
Now that Russia has unleashed the war of aggression against Ukraine, part of the clergy opposed this tradition. A little more than a dozen dioceses took a what’s claimed to be an unprecedented step and decided to stop commemorating the leader of the Russian Orthodox Church during worship services.
However, such a spectacular move does not deprive the Russian church’s branch in Ukraine of its dependence on the Moscow throne. After all, the commemoration of Cyril is only a visible sign of dependence. Besides, there are a number of provisions that regulate the relationship of the Russian Orthodox Church with its branch in Ukraine, and put the latter in direct dependence on Moscow. All of them are spelled out in the relevant statutory documents, such as the church constitutions of the Moscow Patriarchate.
Until they are removed from there, the ROCinU will remain dependent on Moscow. Violation of any of such documents, such as the termination of Cyril’s commemoration, brings no significant change to the position of the whole organization. In fact, this means nothing at all. This can only lead to the violators being punished, rather than to the rupture of communication. In order to completely break this umbilical cord tying ROCinU to Moscow, it is necessary that even the very mention of Ukraine disappear from the statute of the Russian Orthodox Church.
In addition, the ROCinU charter itself reflects their dependence on the Russian Church. Thus, Chapter 1 Paragraph 5 of the statute on the ROCinU management clearly states that it is part of the Moscow Patriarchate, although a self-governing one. In its operations, it is guided by the decisions of the Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church of October 25-27, 1990 (Paragraph 4 of the same Chapter).
It is noteworthy that nothing is said about other councils that took place after 1990. This omission allows for manipulation that other ROC councils have no authority over it. However, this is far from being true, as already in Chapter 2 we find an indication that the ROCinU Council, as the highest governing body, oversees implementation of decisions by ROC councils (Paragraph 6) and must remain united with the ROC. That is, maintaining unity with the Moscow Patriarchate is one of the main principles of the highest governing body of the (Ukraine-based – ed.) Church!
There may be a collision around this, which will be very interesting to observe. It is known that the ROC Council of Bishops is scheduled for May this year. If it adopts at least one statement approving Russian aggression, how will the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine respond? After all, according to the mentioned points, they are obliged to implement these decisions at the highest level!
In addition, the Council of Bishops of the ROC operates based on “decrees of Local and Bishops’ Councils of the ROC, while its head, now it’s Metropolitan Onufriy (Berezovsky), is a permanent member of the Synod of the ROC. In this regard, there is another collision. How will Onufriy respond if a statement is adopted at one of the next synods approving Russia’s aggression against Ukraine? And in general, how can Onufriy take part in any meeting of the ROC Synod after all the crimes Russian terrorists have committed? Would it be okay to sit at the same table with Cyryl Gundyaev, who last Sunday blessed the killing of Ukrainians? The answer to these questions seems obvious!
More about the union of the two structures is laid down in the statute of the ROC itself. It even contains a separate chapter on the so-called UOC. It was created, or rather, separated from the previous statute, in a separate paragraph in 2017. At the time, the amendment to the statute of the Moscow Patriarchate was portrayed by ROCinU mouthpieces as one of the outstanding achievements, which allegedly further expanded the rights and independence of the latter.
In fact, such an amendment to the statute was conditioned by the laws of Ukraine on the religious organizations, whose decision-making center is located in the aggressor state. It’s fear of future legal restrictions on their operations in our country that forced the Moscow clergy to resort to such tricks to trick the Ukrainian society. To this end, the ROCinU was removed from the list of other “independent self-managing” organizations, and put into a separate chapter, in which it was said that the decision-making center of the ROCinU is located in Ukraine.
However, such machinations look rather senseless and insignificant, both from a canonical and legal perspectives. It’s as if there was a separate chapter in the Russian constitution, devoted to Ukraine, in which it would be noted that the decision-making center of Ukraine is located in Kyiv.
Now let’s take a look at this paragraph and see that the ROC and its affiliates are united not only through prayer. This prayerful connection is mentioned only in Paragraph 6 of this chapter, which states that “the name of the Primate is commemorated in all temples of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church after the name of the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia.” The same is said in the above-mentioned statute of the ROCinU. Therefore, I would like to emphasize once again that the move to stop commemorating a Moscow Patriarch is only a violation of one of the provisions of the statute. It’s not about severing all ties.
Paragraph 9 further states that “Bishops of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church are members of the Local and Bishops’ Councils and participate in their work in accordance with Sections II and III of this Charter and in meetings of the Holy Synod.” This means that the entire episcopate of the so-called UOC is obliged to participate in the highest governing bodies on a par with all other hierarchs of the ROC, and that they have no particular privileges or conciliar “veto power”!
The decisions of the ROC Councils “are mandatory” for them. Therefore, returning to the said assumption, it becomes clear that any actions or decisions made by the ROC concerning Ukraine become binding on all ROC representatives.
In view of this, another question arises, quite similar to the two previous ones concerning Metropolitan Onufriy. How will the ROCinU bishops be able to go to Moscow for the May Council of Bishops, even if the war is over by then? The answer here is also quite clear. Every hierarch of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine, who dares to go to Moscow after so many murders of peaceful Ukrainians, including more than a hundred children, will be regarded as a traitor and saboteur!
At the same time, if the bishops don’t go to Moscow, they are likely to be punished by the Russian Orthodox Church and the court of the Moscow Patriarchate. After all, it is “the court of the Council of Bishops is the ecclesiastical court of the highest instance for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church”, which is prescribed in Paragraph 12 of the same chapter. In this way it will be possible to see the true face of the entire episcopate of the ROCinU. In this way, they will show what’s more important to them and what is worse: the anger of their own people or punishment from Moscow.
In conclusion, I’d like to emphasize once again that only abolishing all mentioned ties would be a real testament to the independence of the ROCinU. Violation of any separate norm in this case does not affect the general situation of the Russian church branch in Ukraine. It is only in the secular field that a breach of one of the terms of contract can form grounds for annulment of the contract in general. In this case, there is no such reservation. Therefore, any statement of “independence” in the presence and current documentary fixation of the opposite is just empty words, or a simple lie, with which once again modern Moscow Pharisees are trying to deceive the people.
