Throughout the years of occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (until 2019 it was called the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate) has been subjected to a policy of persecution by the occupation authorities. This piece aims to highlight the main elements of this policy and analyze it as a systemic phenomenon.
Where did it all begin and why is the occupying power going after the Ukrainian Church?
On March 11, 2014, the Council of Bishops of the Kyiv Patriarchate made an official statement, condemning the occupation, and blessed the Ukrainian Army and the whole nation to defend sovereignty and territorial integrity of their country.
Thus, the Church leadership expressed its attitude to the Russian government in Crimea exclusively as an occupation power, established illegitimately. In addition, the statement of the Council of Bishops noted rights violations of believers that had already taken place in the first days of the occupation, in particular, the abduction of parishioners Andriy Shchekun and Anatoliy Kovalskyi.
Subsequently, the Crimean Diocese of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine has repeatedly supported and provided assistance to Ukrainian citizens repressed by the occupying power.
The Orthodox Church of Ukraine in the conditions of occupation openly positions itself as a local church of the Ukrainian people, develops Ukrainian-language liturgical tradition, and prays at the services for “God-protected state of Ukraine, government, people, and its Army”, which clearly shows its rejection of the ideology of the “Russian world” that is being imposed on the people in Crimea by the Kremlin regime.
Being openly authoritarian in nature, the Russian government on principle doesn’t consider acceptable any dialogue with dissidents, usually trying to deal them by force. In the context of Crimea, this trend is exacerbated, as the occupation regime has been tasked with creating a narrative of “originally Russian Crimea” in order to prevent its de-occupation. Accordingly, the Russian government is trying to assimilate or displace everything that doesn’t fit into this narrative and opposes it. In the religious domain, this is done through the oppression of religious organizations that remain beyond the control of the Crimean occupation administration. Accordingly, the OCU’s openly pro-Ukrainian stance is a reason for constant and multilayered pressure exerted on it.
In addition, the persecution of believers and clergy with the OCU is part of Russia’s wider policy of expelling the indigenous population from the territory of Crimea and settling their own citizens in the region.
Russian legislation imposed on Crimea as factor in violating OCU believers’ rights
In accordance with the norms of international humanitarian law (hereinafter – IHL), applied in the circumstances of occupation, Russia must adhere to the principle of status quo ante bellum, refraining from spreading its own legislation to the occupied territories. As for Crimea, this principle is grossly violated, as Russia’s legislation was extended to cover Crimea since the first days of the occupation.
According to Russia’s law, illegally imposed on the territory of Crimea, membership in a religious organization is only allowed for Russian citizens or those staying in Russia on a legal basis (such as holding a residence permit). That is, if someone is willing to openly operate as a member of the religious community, they must hold either a Russian passport or a residence permit. If people refuse to get these documents, they are prohibited from being a member of a religious association and, moreover, deprived of the opportunity to permanently stay in Crimea in line with Russia’s migration law.
This approach had an adverse effect on the religious life of parishioners and priests of the OCU’s Crimean Diocese, who were not formally permanent residents of Crimea at the onset of occupation. For example, there was a case of forced relocation of a priest to mainland of Ukraine due him being unable to obtain a passport or residence permit due to the lack of Crimean residence registration. Today he continues to serve, coming to the Crimea from time to time, but for no more than 90 days during each period of 180 days. This situation significantly impairs quality of religious life of the parishes entrusted to him: without a priest, parishioners can’t regularly participate in worship or attend church sacraments.
Also, the forced transition to the Russian legal field led to the forcible re-registration of all legal entities. For the Church, this move was complicated by the additional need to comply with Russia’s Federal Law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations.” According to this law, it’s only an association registered as a legal entity that holds the status of a religious organization. At the same time, the occupying authorities have repeatedly and under various pretexts denied state registration to the OCU community in Crimea, which in fact deprived the Church of its official status and the corresponding rights that such a status implies.
In 2016, the so-called Yarova’s Law was passed, which, among other things, introduced a new norm into the Russian Code of Administrative Offenses, laying down liability for “illegal missionary work.” Arbitrary interpretation of this norm was applied in August 2021 to persecute OCU Archimandrite Damian for celebrating a Divine Liturgy.
Pressure on OCU clergy and believers in Crimea and asset seizure
From the very start of the occupation, OCU priests and believers suffered all kinds of oppression and human rights violations on the part of the occupation authorities and the aggressive pro-Russian public.
In March 2014, the so-called “Crimean Self-Defense” abducted parishioners Andriy Shchekun and Anatoliy Kovalskyi, who were then subjected to torture and inhuman treatment motivated by religious hatred.
On July 21, 2014, suburban home of the diocese head, Metropolitan Klyment, was set on fire by unidentified perpetrators.
On March 3, 2019, Metropolitan Klyment was detained by the local police while trying to cross out to Rostov-on-Don for a court hearing in the case of Ukrainian political prisoner Pavlo Hryb.
Priest Maksym Volohodin, who was forced to leave Crimea, reported that FSB operatives attempted to recruit him to get from him tips about the diocese’s affairs.
The head of one of the communities, who also left Crimea, reported that he had been summoned for “conversations” by Russian Interior Ministry officials, who openly told him the activities of his parish were seen as undesirable.
One of the OCU parishioners in Crimea reported a case where people who got a job with the civil service after the occupation asked their parents not to visit the Ukrainian Church, as this could cause them problems at work.
On August 23, 2021, OCU Archimandrite Damian (Skokov) was brought to administrative responsibility for celebrating a Divine Liturgy, as it was seen by police as an “illegal missionary activity.” It should be noted that the liturgy is not a missionary activity even under Russian law, as it is for people who are already Orthodox believers and is not aimed at attracting new members to the church.
Throughout 2014, occupation authorities seized from the OCU diocese in Crimea the Intercession Church in the village of Perevalne and the Church of the Apostles Peter and Paul and St. Nicholas in Sevastopol. In addition, suits were filed with the court, which led to judges ruling to allow authorities to seize the premises of a Simferopol cathedral and demolish the parish church in Yevpatoria. To date, these decisions have entered into force under the occupation legislation. And although they have not been fulfilled de facto, the risk of the cathedral being seized and the Yevpatoria chuch being demolished remains significant – it could happen at any moment now
The systemic policy of persecution is intensified by a powerful campaign in the pro-Russian media, which creates a negative image of the OCU’s Crimean diocese. The reports penned within the framework of this campaign try to discredit the OCU as a religious organization, justify actions of the occupation authorities regarding the oppression of this Church, and shift the responsibility for such oppression to the Church itself.
Consequences
As of early 2014, the OCU’s Crimean Diocese had 45 parishes and 14 clerics as part of them. At the beginning of 2022, the diocese has only seven parishes and four clergy left. Thus, before the oppression started, the number of parishes was six times higher, while the number of clergy was triple the current one. In fact, today the diocese is struggling to survive.
International law perspective
The relevant policy of the occupying power is absolutely inadmissible from the point of view of international humanitarian law, which shall be applied in the occupied territory of Crimea and obliges, among other things, to respect the religious life of the population of the occupied territory.
The seizure of temples, as well as actions aimed at demolishing a church building in Yevpatoria, can be classified as war crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
Source: culture.voicecrimea.com.ua, authored by Mykola KIKKAS, lawyer with the Regional Center for Human Rights
