Since June last year, and especially after the controversial enthronement of Metropolitan Joanikije in September, the Montenegrin government, led by Zdravko Krivokapic, had been in limbo. He had been ruling due to the support of a weak majority while being torn apart by internal squabbles. Therefore, his resignation late last week was only a matter of time. Now the country is again forced to observe reformatting in top offices, which could possibly lead to a protracted political crisis, according to Glavcom, a Ukrainian media outlet.
Resignations with a taste of betrayal
On February 4, the Montenegrin parliament passed a no-confidence vote, sacking the government chaired by Zdravko Krivokapic. Three days later, on February 7, MPs also dismissed Parliament Speaker Alex Becic. Becic is also the leader of the Democrats, which, together with the pro-Serbian (read pro-Russian) Democratic Front (DF) and the pro-Western URA (United Reform Action) movement, which after the August 2020 elections formed a governing coalition, breaking a long political hegemony of President Milo Djukanovic’s Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS).
The entire opposition, led by the president’s party, as well as one of the coalition and government partners, URA, voted out the government and sacked Becic. Former allies of the URA – the DF and the Democrats – described the decision as a betrayal and a move to the side of the defeated DPS.
Montenegro’s coalition government collapsed after parliament voted no confidence in it. It was announced by the smallest of the coalition parties, URA, of Deputy Prime Minister Dritan Abazovic, as well as opposition parties. The initiative was supported by 43 legislators, while 11 deputies opposed it. There are only 81 deputies in Montenegro’s parliament.
The reason for voting for the resignation of prime minister and parliament speaker was a months-long crisis of power caused by controversy between both the parliamentary majority and the government, as well as within the government itself. Major clashes between coalition partners have come amid pressure exerted by Serbia, which seeks to see in Krivokapic’s government the pro-Russian Democratic Front and the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), the one that wants to legislate its privileges in Montenegro.
The church has also, in fact, caused a rift between Prime Minister Krivokapic and URA leader, Deputy Prime Minister Dritan Abazovic. In particular, this was due to Krivokapich’s demand to remove security leaders (supervised by Abazovich), who refused to use force against protesters during the Metropolitan’s enthronement in Cetinje. In addition, Krivokapich’s government came under constant attack from the Democratic Party of Socialists, which could not accept losing the election and sought revenge.
Abazovic’s plan
Having done his “job” with the Krivokapich government, Dritan Abazovic said he was ready to take up responsibility for the nation’s fate and offered to form a minority government which he would lead.
On January 17, he presented the concept of such a government and noted that its main tasks would be to unblock the country’s European path, carry out a number of important reforms, including the ones of the judiciary, prosecutor’s office, and the electoral system, as well as focusing on the economy and preparing for the tourist season. In addition, he promised to sign the so-called Main agreement with the Serbian Church, which, he said, “would create an atmosphere in which the reconciliation system would work better than it does now.”
Speaking about his future government, Abazovic immediately stressed that there would be no room for two political forces – the pro-Serbian and pro-Russian Democratic Front and President Djukanovic’s Democratic Party of Socialists. As for the previous, it is because of its open anti-NATO stance, and as for the latter, it is because of the reputation of the deeply corrupt party formed during its 30-year rule. According to Abazovic, these forces can support the government while not being part of it.
He recently reiterated that a new government does not mean the bring back to power the Democratic Party of Socialists. Despite such statements by the URA leader, Djukanovic’s party has already stated it will support the minority government nominated by him and has confirmed that it will not be part of it.
The basis for the formation of a minority government can be a memorandum signed in December between URA, its partner in the governing coalition – the Civis NGO, the Socialist People’s Party (SPP), which used to be allied with the Democratic Front, and the Albanian and Bosniak parties that were in opposition. The memorandum contains the signatories’ commitment to Montenegro’s civil and European values and aims at reconciliation in Montenegro and economic development.
For their part, Zdravko Krivokapic, Democrats, and smaller parties on the Democratic Front, as well as organizations close to the Serbian Orthodox Church, oppose Abazovic-proposed government, which will be backed by the Democratic Party of Socialists. At the same time, the pro-Serbian Democratic Front insists that the new government be formed by the current members of the ruling majority and minority parties, while the Democrats, allied with the dismissed Speaker of Parliament, Alex Becic, call on holding snap elections.
At the same time, they are holding protests accusing the URA of betraying the “election result and the will of the people” and opening the door to the defeated Democratic Party of Socialists to come back to power.
Dubious prospects
Abazovic is currently in active talks to form a minority government with the support of Djukanovic’s party and the current opposition. He also counts on support of the international community, which is interested in forming a (preferably pro-European) government in the country as soon as possible, thus avoiding further political instability. However, even if Abazovic succeeds in forming a minority cabinet, there are doubts it will be able to function properly for any considerable period. There are several reasons to assume that.
First, any minority government is usually unstable and operates for a short period, right until a new conflict arises between the parties that supported it. This usually leads to the dissolution of parliament and the calling of new elections. A new conflict, given that the largest force to support a minority government is the Democratic Party of Socialists, which seeks revenge, could emerge fairly quickly. The main “apple of discord” between it and the URA may be the implementation of real reforms in the country, which, in particular, means cleansing the government and state institutions from the DPS operatives, as well as launching corruption probes.
In addition, the unwillingness to form a government with the pro-Serbian Democratic Front and willingness to enlist support of Djukanovic’s DPS will be a kind of red rag for Belgrade. Despite the fact that the previous government was supported by the DF, Krivokapich did not want to take its representatives on board.
As a result, he was constantly attacked by pro-government Serbian tabloids and had tense relations with Serbian President Vucic.
Another problematic issue for Abazovic and the DPS will be the so-called Main agreement with the Serbian Church, according to which the state of Montenegro must settle property and legal relations with the religious organization. When the DPS lost power, many rejoiced in Serbia and in the Serbian Orthodox Church, as the main obstacle to signing the Agreement had been removed.
However, hopes that it would be signed off by the government of Zdravko Krivokapic, who is close to the Serbian Church, were never meant to materialize. The man refused to sign it, for which he was immediately accused of “turning his back on the Church” and attacked by circles close to the SOC and DF.
Abazovic, in turn, promised to sign the Main Agreement with the Church. However, if he signs it in its current version, he will lose support not only of the DPS, but also of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Social Democrats (SD). In particular, the SDP emphasizes that the draft Main Agreement contradicts the secular character of the state in many elements, is full of historical untruths and falsifications, and in many ways puts the SOC not only above other religious communities but also above the Montenegrin Constitution and a number of laws.
Other critics of the accord describe it as one in which the Serbian Orthodox Church will be not so much a state within a state but a state over a state.
On the other hand, if Abazovic doesn’t sign the version of the agreement he wants for the Serbian Church, or tries to change it, he will, like his predecessor Krivokapic, fall under a flow of criticism by Serbian pro-government media, the Democratic Front that is close to Serbia’s president, and face protests organized by the Orthodox. Milo Djukanovic and his DPS have already felt well what the Serbian-led religious protests in Montenegro could lead to.
Another problem for Abazovic’s cabinet could be the Belgrade-based Open Balkans initiative (which includes Serbia, Albania, and Northern Macedonia). Until recently, the parliamentary majority had a consensus on the issue and with some cosmetic changes in the approach was, in fact, ready to approve it. However, the DPS strongly opposes the initiative, seeing it as a tool to increase Serbian influence in the country.
Therefore, there are enough reasons to believe that, if a minority government is formed, it will be only temporary and holding early parliamentary elections in the country will only be a matter of time. Their outcome may depend on several factors: the attitude of the international community, the influence of Belgrade, which has political favorites in Montenegro, and the actions of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which has strongly meddled in Montenegro’s internal political processes over the recent years, as well as the ability of political movements, now opposing the minority government, to join forces. At the same time, there is currently no certainty as to which vector the country will choose after such elections are held and whether they will lead to the same situation that’s been observed over the last year and a half.
Montenegro may face a protracted political crisis that is unlikely to contribute to the country’s European integration, but it will certainly create favorable conditions for even deeper penetration and rooting of the Serbian, and therefore “Russian,” world.
